How did supply logistics work during World War II? Which country had the best logistics technology during the World War II ?

How did supply logistics work during World War II? Which country had the best logistics technology during the World War II?

Defense & Military History and Wars 

Military logistics is the discipline of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of military forces. In its most comprehensive sense, it is those aspects or military operations that deal with: Design, development, acquisition, storage, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel.

A 1941 German Panzer division had 11.800 men and required 30 tons of supplies per day when inactive to 700 tons per day in heavy fighting. A 1941 infantry division was larger, 17.200 men and required between 80 tons per day (inactive) to 1.100 tons per day (heavy fighting). In practice, food and equipment requirements are relatively constant but fuel, lubricants and ammunition vary depending on the fighting conditions.

It was more difficult to keep a Panzer Division properly replenished, despite its lower tonnage-requirements, than an infantry division. The reason is that the former would start the day in a certain place and by the end of the day it could be 30km (19 miles) or more farther ahead, forcing the supply columns to deliver the same ton of goods a longer distance.

German factories shipped fuel, oil and lubricants (POL), ammo, food rations, and other equipment (spare parts, medical equipment, soap, razor blades, weapon cleaning kits, boots, etc.) to depots in the Reich’s zone of the interior where storage and readiness for delivery took place. These depots then shipped their supplies by railroad to rail heads on the fighting front at the rear of the Army Groups where unloading ensued. Army supply columns of motorized vehicles then moved the stores to the divisional depots in the rear of the zone of combat.

The goal was to deliver whatever the troops consumed the previous day. From the railhead to the divisional collecting points the maximum distance during Barbarossa did not exceed 200 km (125 miles). An Opel Blitz 3.6 truck had a range of 400 km (250 miles), so considering that it had to deliver supplies and return, and that the roads were not perfectly straight, the radius of action was roughly 150km (90 miles).

This means that a 200-km delivery, required using some of the payload to carry the return-trip fuel, not to mention 12 hours total driving. Therefore, to increase efficiency and minimize use of scarce fuel, the German logisticians selected railheads as close as possible to the zone of combat. The distance may not appear too long for the reader, accustomed perhaps, to hear that a modern logistics truck can deliver cargo from the Eastern US Coast to the Western Coast, a 4000-km distance. But these lorries get fuel en route. In Russia, there were no gas stations waiting for the German supply columns, and the trucks transported the fuel for the round-trip themselves.

The German field supply organization typically delivered the supplies to the troops in 3 steps after the stores were in the railheads: (1) Army supply columns delivered the supplies from the railheads to the army dumps, parks and collecting points. This organization, named Grosstransportraum could deliver 20,000 tons per day behind each of the army groups. For Barbarossa, each army group had a dedicated motorized regiment for this purpose. (2) The divisional organic supply companies then moved these supplies from the army dumps to the divisional collecting points. (3) Finally, the battalion supply columns picked up the stocks from the divisional collecting points and delivered them to the combat troops through battalion or company distribution points. Troops themselves would go to these points for resupply. During prolonged fighting, the commander had to maintain troops in reserve fully supplied to replace a unit in the front that had depleted its ammo or he had to use troops to fetch the ammunition to the engaged units.

The system was flexible enough to swiftly support the advance or to avert enemy countermeasures attempting to prevent this from happening. Re-routing through friendly controlled areas, even if it necessitated a longer distance, was common to bypass a blocked road. In some cases, air-lifting was the only means to forestall a critical situation.